As a political figure, Henry A. Wallace was one of tbe most colorful and controversial ¡wrsonalities to emerge out of the New Deal. With a distinctive agrarian argot, he often sounded like some latter-day prairie prophet summoning a lost generation to the Promised Land.
This unique idealist from Iowa preached reform and predicted the day would come when all Americans would live in affluence. His optimistic outl(K)k brought hope to millions vvlio were poverty stricken during tbe most dismal period of depression the nation had ever endured. Wallace was an audacious apostle of abundance in a decade when the people were imaccustomed to the pleasures of prosperity. He was labeled by some a dreamer of dreams and a misguided zealot, sincere but impractical. Critics overlooked the fact that he was the architect and successful administrator of massive farm programs. The Triple-A and the Ever Normal Granary were effective measures to raise rural income; tlicy were neither chimerieal nor Utopian. The confused image of Henry Wallace, compounded by his ill-fated Progressive Part)' campaign in 1949, arose because of the dual nature of his political activit\'. As a knowledgeable agricultural economist, Wallace was both realistic and imaginative; but simultaneously he possessed an Edenic vision of a new America. His ma<^nifi('ent rhetoric of reform, punctuated by religious fervor, sought to initiate a transformation of society. The immediate objective was to render assistance to fanners, while the ultimate goal of his endeavor was the attainment of universal social justice.
As the tliird generation scion of the Wallaces of Iowa, agricultural leadership was part of the family tradition inherited by Henry A. Wallace. His grandfather, a former and was instrumental in securing adininistratiou backing tor a considerable amount of remedial legislation. ' The advent of Goi>lidge to the presidency brought an end to federal aid for Legislation which wa.s beneficial to agriculture inclndcd: t-xtcnsion ot the War Finiince Cnriioratiou, increiisetl capitnl for the Fedrral Lund Banks, an agriciiUiiral represpntative was placed upon the Federal Reserve Board, Packers and Stockyard.s Act, Grain Futures Act, cooperatives were exempted from anti-trust prosecution and the Intermediate Credit Act, See the cabinet papers of Henry C. Wallace in the Warren G. Harding Papers (The Ohio Historical Society, Columbus). the farmer. The unexpeeted illness and subsequent death of Henry C. Wallace in 1924 deprived the niral populaee of an important spokesman within an administration whose interest was focused on fostering private enterprise-and not upon rendering govemment assistanee to agriculture. Even though the Farm Bloc in Congress twice passed the McNary-Haugen Bill to set up a federal agency to dispose of suq^hises in overseas markets, the effort was stemly rebuked with vetoes from the White House."
It was during this arid era of Coolidge that the young Henry A. Wallace made the Wallaces' Farmer into the most influential farm joumal in the nation. The third Wallaee was, perhaps, the best qualified of the trio. He was the legatee of the family's heritage and continued the practice of fusing agrarian idealism with agricultural realism. As a student at Iowa State College, he had majored in agronomy-but made a serious study of economics. At that time Wallace eame under the infiuence of Professor Benjamin H. Hibbard, who was to impress upon him a faet he w ould never forget, namely, that high tariffs were harmful and not helpful to agrieulture.'* In an effort to broaden his knowledge, Wallace took additional courses at Drake University and read widely in history and economics. His scholarly pursuits led him to tbe works of Thorstein Veblen. The iconoelast and erratic genius, whom Wallace met only once, beeame his mentor in economies. Wallace embraced institutional economics as though it were divine revelation. It provided him with a conceptual framework and also confirmed his suspicion that tlie farmer was the victim of a price system controlled by busine-ssmen whose only interest was private gain. He became aware of the adverse effect of competition, individualism, and laissez faire trial lîodies upon the earths climate." As early as 1915, the Wallaces Farmer began publishing his corn-hog ratio price charts and in 1925 he co-authoretl, with mathematician George Snedecor, the work Correlation and Machine Calculation. Wallace sought to inform farmers of the importance of economics snd in so doing relate to them the significance of tariffs, wase levels, consumer demand, foreini markets and land values. It was in this area, as a publisher, thiit Wallace performed his t^reatest service to rural leaders, for he also enlightened them on such matters as war debts, reparations, currency exchange rates, international credit and monetary reform '" He, unlike the heads of miiny farm organizations, viewed agriculture in its totality. His scope was international. He tried to rid farm leaders of their narrow provincialism. Farms were not isolated units, Wallace kept insisting, but were collective parts of world production.
In a scholarly work. Agricultural Prices, Henry A. Wallace arrived at some startling conclusions. Tbis study, issued in 1920. was based upon the analyzation of market receipts at Chicago, records of bank clearings, and a tabulation of cost factors in commodity production. He claimed the so-called free market operated to the disadvantage of the fanner. First, agricultural products were dumped on the market in such a way as to drive prices down and sea)udly, he discovered the market was actually manipulated in favor of the buyers. Impaled upon the cornucopia of ovei-production. the individual fanner could do nothing to help himself. Wallace advised organized effort among farmers. "They will find it necessary," he predicted, "to practice sabotage in the same scientific businesslike way as labor and capital." In addition to deliberate curtailment of production to sustain high prices, he called for an abolitiijn of the "speculative or market price system." The price-fixing authority grantwl to the government during World War I, Wallace pointed out, was federal intervention for the purpose of managiug the economy. Why could it not be done again? No system was sacred and refonns were urgently nettled. The farmer received inadequate remuneration for his labor and some change had to be made to assure tillers of the soil at least tlic cost of their production. Reflecting the influence of Veblen upon his own thought, Wallace cited the need for institutional reform and the necessity for specific economic "machinery." The former meant an alteration of attitudes and habits {e.g. competition and individualism), while the later iuvited the creation of special agencies to assist the fanner. Sueh guidance of the economy. Wallace insisted, would stabilize the "violent fiuctiiations in supply and demand" and would remove personal profit as the "sole motive" for incentive. The primary criteria for controlling the productive capacit)' of both the fann and factory wouW be the nation's general welfare. Private exploitation would, iu efleet. be supplanted by the superior needs of the masses. Needless to say, this type of thinking was ecjuated with Bolshevism in 1920.'
The plight of the farmer worsened during the twenties and thirties. The plague of surpluses continued. Technology, such as the tractor and improved farm machinery, increased the output of food and fiber; while domestic consumption diminished and overseas markets disappeared. President Hoover , Agricultural Prices ( Des Moines, 192Ü), 1-17, 27-2«, 109-110. approved the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1929, but the Federal Farm Board it established had no mechanism for preventing excess production. What little assistance was rendered in efficient marketing was negated by other factors. Tightened purse strings due to the severity of the depression, the Hawley-Smoot Tariff and the tangled war deht-reparations problems all ser\'ed to reduce the demand for agricultiual commodities. Wallace ustxl his farm journal to agitate for measures geared to stimulate buying. He urged a lowering of the tariff, cancellation of war debts, drastic reduction of reparations, loans to foreign countries, international monetaiy agreements, devaluation of the dollar, and an easy credit pohcj on the domestic scene.'^ As the national ectmomy ground to a halt and showed signs of stagnation, Walace urged public works, a moratorium on debts and public relief for suffering people. '" Herbert Hoover, however, remained faithful to his economic dogma. He acted-but with a cautious timidity.
The suffering ciuised by the depression, and the cruel paradox of poverty amid plenty, served as a catalyst. Henrv A. Wallace, while proffering practical solutions, could not refrain from preaching the need for eamomic reforms leading to a more equitable distribution of the nation's wealth. C^om-pelled by conscience to speak out, he beheved the time had '^Future Price Trends, Gold And The Farmer," WF, vol. 52 (October 28, 1927 (October 28, ), 1396 "For Au Honest Dollar," WF ù III, vol. 56 (January 17, 1931 ), 66; "Tariff Insanity Is World-Wide," WF i? Ill, vol. 5fi (May 9, 1931) come for a total social transformation. The "prophets of both the Old and the New Testament," he affirmed, had a "Brm grasp of the fundamental essence of all economics and sociology, namely, justice."^' To Wallaee it was a social sin to tolerate a eondition where "whole elasses of our people are impoverished at the same time as other classes are made rich."'"' The speetacle of want and privation moved Wallaee to editorialize: "So far as the economies of the situation is eoncerned, Isaiah, 'Uncle Henr)'' and the modern economists who talk about increasing the eonsumer's purchasing [)ower are recommending the same cure for hard times. This cure is simply tliat a greater percentage of the income of the nation he turned back to the mass of the [X'Ople."'" By 19.32, Wallace and most of the farm leaders were eompletely disenchanted with the G.O.P. As the paladin of rugged individualism, Herbert Hoovers impotence in dealing with the calamitous events brought disrepute to his economic philosophy. Franklin D. Roosevelt, well aware of agrarian diseontent, took the initiative in making eontaet with Henry Wallaee. The Governor of New York encouraged insurgency and realized he must first win over the fami leaders. A fine reception was accorded to Hemy Wallace as he met with the Demoeratic nominee at Hyde Park. The Iowa editor told iiis rural readers that Roosevelt revealed a surprising "knowledge and sympathy" for agriculture. "He is better fitted than most," he coneluded, "to draw the right kind of men to him."'' With the favorable image of Roosevelt still in his mind, Wallace informed his friend, William Hirth ( editor of the Mmoiiri Fanner) , that the Democratic nominee was a "most charnung gentleman with the right kind of spirit and an open mind. ' "'
••"Biblical Denunciation Of floartlcrs," WF ¿' ///, vol. 57 (Septembers, 1932), 460.
• Wallace viewed it as a practical way to cut suq>luses aiid regarded it as a valuable social tool to foster a sense of cooperation among independent farmers.•" Tt was the very mechanism he had written about in 1920. The VDAP became the essence of the first Triple-A program in 1933.
The leadership displayed by Roosevelt during the campaign struck a responsive chiird within Henry Wallaee. The Iowan once wired F.D.R., "It is heart warming to work for appreciation sueh as yours."^^ In order to win the farm vote for the New York Covemor, Wallace wrote an unetiuivoeal endorsement: "Roosevelt is progressive and definitely sympathetic to the fann program. . . . The only tiling to vote for in this election is justice for agriculture. With Roosevelt, tbe farmers have a chance-with Hoover, none."^"* Following Roosevelt's convincing triumph, he asked Wal-laee to join his eabinet. With an intense desire to participate in an administration pledged to action, Wallace accepted the po.sition of Secretary of Agriculture. With zeal and speed, he set about getting a fami bill written so a.s to take advantage of the emergency session of Congress. His first fight was to repel the onslanght of rural representatives, who were eager to enact ever}' Populi.st panacea ever enunciated. The final produet, the Agricnltnral Adjnstinent Aet of 1933, was the handiwork of professors, not that of neoPopulists. Wallace and administration supporters thwarted wild schemes that included total price fixing (tantamount to nationalizing the land) and mandator)'" inflation laws (including the printing of ])a[X'r money).''* Economists conceived and carried ont tlie Triple-A program. Its aim was threefold; control of production, elevation of farm income and the indncement of cooperation among the total farm population. The AAA worked with Count)' Committees, set quotas, and enforced compliance.^" As acreage allotment payments and govemment loans began to How into the fann belt, the rural revolt subsided and threats of violence diminishcxl. The AAA raised income levels of commercial producers while preserving the family sized farm. Little, however, was done to aid the downtrodden share- Wallace hastened to secure a substitute measure to circumvent the high tribunal's ruHng. Tbe Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act of 19.36, primarily the work of Howard R. Tolley, was enacted as an interim program."^^ The permanent plan, which would come with the passage of the Agricultural Adjustment Aet of 1938, was the proiluet of Wallace's fertile mind.^^ It de-emphasized acreage reduction and stressed storage as a means of handling surpluses. The Commodit)' Credit Corporation was the instrument used to control tlie marketing of agricultural commodities. After the Farm Security Administration was established, to aid sharecroppers and tenants, and the Food Stamp program as inavigurated to assure adequate diets for low income families; Henr)' Wallace felt satisfied. He bad helped agriculture while making it serve the general welfare.^* When it became obvious the nation was slipping into a recession in 1937, Wallace tried to arouse the President into taking counter-measures to check the dechne. "I know you will not let us get into a downward spirallinci; Hoover tail spin," he wrote to Roosevelt, "even though private capital should become completely demoralized."^" Wallace outlined a comprehensive economic program., which included ; public housing, "mainteniince of fann purchasing power," labor legislation to sustain consumption, "cheap credit," encouragement of "private capital," and the use of "govemment capital ... in case of need."'"
Wallace not only played the part of an economic adviser; but with Roosevelt's assent, he assumed the role of ideologist for the Now Deal. Using pen and podium, Wallace continned to call for basic refonns. The unholy alliance of social Darwinism, laissez faire economics and the Protestant ethic had created a set of institutions based upon scarcity, he claimed, and the time had come to alter the more.s and mental attitude of the American people to fit contemporary conditions. The complexities of an industrial-urban economy had made humans the unwilling victims of unemployment. Faith in frugality, rugged individualism and self reliance did nothing to alleviate the basic malady, namely, :m economy that failed to serve tbe needs of the people. Co-operation, concern for the general welfare and a spirit of altniism, Wallace asserted, would make it possible to have the blessings of an economy of abundance. Tecbnology made imiversal affluence feasible, he was sure, if only economists would assist in creating the social machinery needed to distribute the wealth equitably among the population. Through regulatory and reform legislation, be argued, the New Deal was fostering social justice. Using the lexicon of the Social Gospel, Wallace enunciated this litany of hope: "The religious keynote, the economic keynote, tbe scientific keynote of the new age must be the overwhelming realization that mankind now has such control over nature that the doctrine of the struggle for existence is definitely outmoded and replaced by the higher law of co-operation . . . then the vision of Isaiah and the insight of Christ will be on "Letter, HAW to FDR, November 30, 1937, PSF, Franlthn D. Rtwsevelt Library. '"'HAW, "Agriculture, Business, Labor And Government," Washington Star Radio Forum, December 6, 1937, FSF, Franklin I). Roose\'e]t Library. their way toward realization.'"" Conservative critics heaped scom upon Wallace. Some labeled him a dangerous radical, while others lampooned liis ideas as the a[X>calyptic daydre^ims of an impractical visionary. President R(x)sevelt, however, regarded him as a politieal asset. Wallace's pronouncements were popular with the electorate. F.D.R. also viewed his Secretary of Agriculture as a knowledgeable, imaginative, and effective administrator. His record and rhetorie, the President reasoned, were merely proof of Wallace's "j>raetical idealism."'" Thus he pt^rsonally chose Henry A. Wallace as his nmning mate in 1940.
On July 30, 1941, President Roosevelt utilized powers granted to him by (congress to establish the Economie Defense Board. By executive order, F.D.R. made Vice President Wallace the Chairman. Soon after, Wallace was also designated Chairman of the newly ereated Supply Priorities and Allocation Board. In one stroke, Wallaee became the most powerful Vice President up to that time."" The administrative power delegated to him by the President gave Wallace complete authority over "exports, imports, . . . prechisive buying, hansaetions in foreign exchange, . , . international investments and extension of credit;"^" as well as discretionary power relative to the Issuance of priorities for the "pnieuremcnt, production, transmission of materiaLs, articles, power fuel and other commodities."*'' After Pearl Harbor, the Economic Defense •'•'He utilized bis position as a wartime administrator to enbance tbe war effort and to prepare for tbe [xistwar era. Many of lii.s speeches were aimed at preparing public opinion for full international cooperation witbin tbt! United Nations. See Henry Agard Wallace Papers, Library of Congress.
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Board was eonverted into the Board of Economic Warfare and its dnties were increased to "advise the State Department on Lend-lease arrangements" and to "conduct negotiations for a post-war economic settlement.'"*'' Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State, complained that Roosevelt was "virtually creating another State Department"'^'' and succeeded in getting the President to reduce some of the powers of the B.E.W. (New York, 1951) , 491.
•" 'Letter, FDR to HAW, July 15, 1943 , FDR, Public Papers, 1943 Letter, LL-O T. Crowley to authors, March 3, 1904. ""Edwin W. Fauley, "Why Truman Is President," as told to Rieliard English, unpublished memorandum, 37 pp.; Samuel I. Rosenman, Working With Roosevelt (New York, 1952). 438-439; Edward j. Flynn, You're the Boss (New York, 1947), 180; U. S. Senate, Committee On Commerce, Hearings on S.375, 79th Coug., 1st Sess., 1945, 24-84; U. S. Congressional Record, 79lh Cong., 1st Sess., 1945, vol. 91, Part I, 693. office, Franklin D. Roosevelt was dead. The mantle of leadership, which for a season seemed destined for Wallace, now passed to the man from Missouri. Wallace's devotion to Roosevelt was never transferred to Tiimian. As Secretarv of Commerce, he proceeded to outline his own program for both domestic and foreign affairs. To insure post-war prosperity, Wallace proposed a plan whereby the government would commit itself to a policy of full employment. It was imperative, he asserted in his book Sixty Million Jobs (pubhshed in 194.5) , that Congress immediately "equip govemment with authority to act in immediate co-operation with private enterprise once incipient unemployment points to the danger of mass unt-mploymcnt."" Walliice envi.sagt^l an expanding economy, spnrred on by federal programs to encourage higher consumption. Fiscal policies should be planned, he urged to ])ro!note prosperity. His primary concern was to see the national economy balanced-not the budget. Tn this same vohime, Wallace made many proposals which were anticipatory of things to come. He suggested foreign aid programs, an attack upon domestic poverty, health insurance, guaranteed annual wages, goveminent sponsored research, public works, federal aid to education and civil rights legislation.'Ê conomists and academicians may have winced a bit at Vallace's reference to the "social ideas of the Semion on the Mount,'"* but Sixty Million Jobs was applauded by those of the Keynesian persuasion. Dr. Alvin H. Hansen, of Harvard University, praised the work as an "education in applied economics" and urged that it be "read and reread by everv voter."' ' President Truman requested an autographed copy of tlie book, informing his Secretary of Commerce; "I have been reading the reviews and they seem to have really gone to town on them."" Truman assigned to Wallace the responsibility for overseeing that part of his legislative program dealing with "MAW. Si.vfy ,^/í7/Hiít Jobs (New York, 1945), 33 •'^Ibid., 49, 111, llfi, 126-1.33, 142, 185, 208. II. Hansen, Economic Policy And Full Eiuiitmimeni (New York and London, 1947) , 307.
••••Letter, HST to HAW, September 10, 1945, OF. Harry S. rriinuni Library ( Independenee, Missouri). asserted, since it sought to "eliminate the deadly threat of instahilit)." This "solemn commitment" on the part of the govemment to in.sure full employment was only the first step, he elaimeil, sinee aetion programs would ha\e to follow if needed.^" Even though Wallace was disappointed over the deletion.s that had to he made to secure enactment of the hill, he viewed the establi.shment of the Council of Economic Advisers to the President as an exeellent mechanism for fostering intelligent poliey making. Democratic planning, rational management of the economy and federal intervention to stimulate buying power were the three pillars upon whieh Wallaee ereete<l his jwst-war plans for prosperity. During tlie brief time he held the position as the Secretary of Cominerec, Wallace labored ineeasingly to assure implementation of polieics that would prevent a recurrenee of the tragic eonsequenees of World War I.'"' Wallace's increased involvement in foreign poliey affairs ultimately caused his dismissal from the cabinet. His apprehension over the deterioration of Soviet-American relations prompted him to criticize United States foreign policy. When James F. Byrnes, the Secretary of State, complained to Truman, the President asked the Secretary of C^ommeree for his resignation." Wallace became eilitor of the New Republic in 1946 and from that position launched his ill-fated third party movement. Wallaee was sineere in his longings for peace, but his idealism ran rampant. With little comprehension of the aims of the Soviet Union, he more and more plaeed the onus for the Cold War upon his own country. "Those who put hatred of Russia in their feelings and actions," he wrote in the New Repithlic, "do not believe in peace." Wallace acted from deep convictions. He was motivated by a pacifistic hatred of war and a belief that international amity could be fostered by the application of Christian principles to international relations. "Peace, to endure," he avowed, "Must be built, not on force and deceit, but on understanding."'''' Unfortimately for Wallace, the Progressive Party of 1948 attracted Communists as well as sincere advocate» of peace. Thus the taint of dislovaltv rubbed off on Wallace and his (juixotic cmsade for peace ended his ¡MÜtieal career. A retroactive shadow of doubt, red in hue, was cast over all of his former ideas and activities. Even though be repudiated the Progressive Party in 1950 and supported the United States action in the Korean conflict, he could not undo the damage to his reputation caused by his futile eampaign of 1948.'"' During his long career in public life, Henry A. Wallaee had matured from a rural mstic into an astute agricultural economist. Imbued with the Christian idealism of his grandfather and introduced into farm polities by his father, tbe voim^est of the Henr\' Wallaces evolved his own rehgio-econoniic philosophy. Driven by an inner compulsion, he was relentless in his endeavors to bring about the attainment of universal social justice. In the realm of economics, his ideas were sometimes clear and realistic-but at other times were vague and impractical. He was always the conscience of the New Deal. As an unrelenting crusader, he never let the American people forget that social reforms were both necessary and possible. The moral precepts of the Sermon on the Monnt were guides, economics a tool, and politics the mtians of implementing his ideals. Throughout his tumnltnous career he sought to serve humanity. He never waivercd from this pursuit, even though forced to endure political pillorying because of his beliefs. With faith in the future, he envisioned a world without war or want. In 1949., Henry Wallace spoke from the pulpit of the Community Churcli of New York (jty. In his sermon, he summarized his jx)Iitical pliilosophy:
The Kingdom of Heaven here on earth ean only be attained when men in their politics, their daily work, their science, their art. their philosophy, and tlieir rcliijion are reachinfj out contimiously for an evcu higher manifestation and appn^-iation of that blissful, nnmanifested reality which we eall God . . . Tht' hi.'.st way to praise Cod is rijrht h'Te on earl h by helping Him to luifolii liis joyous plan for all humanit\.
Henry A. Wallace spent his last years at Farvue Farm in South Salem, N. Y. The rural atmosphere of his home provided a quiet retreat from the turmoil of politics, but more important to him it was a welcome return to the open countr)-side. Wallace loved to work with plants and now he had the opportimity to resume his long neglected experiments in genetics. Each passing year was a thrill for him as he obserx'ed new and improved varieties of plant life emerge from the soil. A strange muscular affliction, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, cut short his scientific endeavors. Death came on Nov. 18, 1965, at the age of 77 years. Before succumbing to this incurable malady, however, he allowed his pain wracked bodv to be used for medical experimentation. Realizing his own case was hopeless, he died knowing he had tried to help future sufferers of this dreadful disease. It was his last gesture of good will to mankind.
